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Abstract 
This paper considers the opposition within Conservative parliamentary ranks to the 
decision of the Cameron administration to ring fence spending on overseas 
development aid (ODA) or international aid. Using documentary analysis from a 
range of parliamentary debates and divisions in the 2010 to 2015 Parliament, the paper 
pieces together the arguments against legally enshrining spending on international 
aid at 0.7 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) made by Conservative 
parliamentarians. We define each Conservative parliamentarian as either aid critics 
(voted or spoke out against the 0.7 percent target); aid sceptics (abstained and did not 
publicly speak out for the 0.7 percent target); and aid advocates (those who voted and 
spoke out for the 0.7 percent target). We then consider the overlap between hard 
Euroscepticism (i.e. Brexit) to see the extent to which issues of national identity may 
explain hostility towards international aid spending.  
Keywords: British foreign policy; international aid, overseas development, national 
identity, Euroscepticism.  
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Introduction 
 
The approach of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010 to 
2015 to international aid policy represents a conundrum. Although the Liberal 
Democrats had a long standing commitment to increasing international aid spending, 
the coalition position was largely due to the conversion of the Conservatives in this 
policy area. This is significant as the policy approach of the Conservatives, as the 
dominant party in the coalition, defied expectations, as the assumptions that exist 
within the academic literature would have suggested that international aid spending 
should have gone down. The following factors drive these assumptions. First, centre-
right governments tend not to prioritise international aid spending. The percentage of 
GNI devoted to international aid was 0.51 when Labour left office in 1979 and 0.57 
when they left office in 2010, but it was 0.27 when the Conservatives had left office in 
1997. That is because centre-left administrations are driven by notions of equality, 
rights and humanitarianism which justify intervening to alleviate global poverty, 
whereas centre-right administrations view this as an interference within the 
economies of both donor and recipient countries (Chaney, 2013). Such assumptions 
are also prevalent within the comparative literature (Therien and Noel, 2000; and 
Therien, 2002). Second, periods of economic downturn create budgetary constraints, 
squeezing out international aid provision (Tingley, 2010 and Dang et al, 2013; Heinrich 
et al, 2016). Finally, electoral support for international aid spending tends to exist in 
an abstract sense—it is desirable, but domestic poverty reduction should take 
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precedence—i.e. support is wide but not deep, and politicians have incentives (due to 
the need for re-election) to respond to such voter preferences (Van Heerde and 
Hudson, 2010; Hudson and Van Heerde, 2012; Henson and Lindstrom, 2013).  
 
All of these factors suggest that spending on international aid should have gone 
down as a percentage of GNI, and yet international aid spending was ring fenced in 
the austerity measures that were implemented after 2010 (the only other department 
to be ring fenced was Health) (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012). The level of spending 
increased dramatically after 2012 when the figure was £8,766 billion (0.56 percent of 
GNI) to the 2015 figure of £12.240 billion (0.72 percent of GNI) (Lunn and Booth, 2016). 
By doing so the UK became the first G8 country to hit the international aid target of 
0.7 percent of GNI (this target was reaffirmed at the G8 summit of July 2005 and had 
originally been identified as a target back in 1974). Only four other nations met the 
target before the UK and have a higher GNI percentage—Sweden first reached it in 
1974, Norway in 1976, Denmark in 1978 and Luxembourg in 2000 (Booth, 2014). 
Alongside increasing spending to hit the target, the coalition introduced the 
International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act of 2015, 
which ensured that future governments would be placed under a legal obligation to 
spend 0.7 percent of GNI on international aid. This was significant as it made the UK 
the first member of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) to enshrine the 0.7 percent target in law (Manji, 2016). 
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Despite the creation of a cross party consensus between the Conservative 
leadership and Labour and the Liberal Democrats, criticism of international aid 
prioritisation began to emerge from three groups: first, from UKIP, whose official line 
of ‘charity begins at home’ (Jones and England, 2015) was expressed in more offensive 
terms by Godfrey Bloom MEP, when he spoke of wasted resources going to ‘bongo 
bongo land’ (Mason, 2013); second, from sections of the print media whose negativity 
meant that international aid was also presented from a narrow domestic perspective 
at the expense of the needs of recipient countries (Cawley, 2015). The Mail on Sunday 
was at the vanguard of this and they encouraged public support for their petition 
calling for the Government to ‘stop spending a fixed 0.7 percent of our national wealth 
on foreign aid’—this passed the threshold for qualification leading to a debate within 
Westminster Hall by the Petitions Committee in June 2016. The third group which 
openly criticised international aid prioritisation was the backbenchers of the 
Conservative Party. Former International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, 
a keen proponent of the 0.7 percent target, would later admit that it became a ‘running 
sore’ and a ‘focus’ of anti-Cameron ‘discontent’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 279, 
284).  
 
Our paper examines those that opposed the 0.7 percent commitment within the 
PCP. The first section of the paper uses documentary analysis (i.e. parliamentary 
debates and divisions) to identity their arguments—both from a policy making and 
political strategy perspective. In the second section of the paper we position each 
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Conservative MP as being either aid critics (voted and spoke out against), aid sceptics 
(abstained and did not speak for); or aid advocates (voted for and spoke out in favour). 
We also aim to identify the correlation between being an aid critic and hard 
Euroscepticism (i.e. Brexit) and whether aid critics faced constituency level pressures 
from UKIP that may explain their hostility.  
 
The Case against International Aid Prioritisation on the Conservative Backbenches 
 
Conservative critics on the backbenches have crafted their opposition to the 0.7 
percent commitment on international aid around two broad questions: a) is it effective 
from a policy-making perspective and b) is it sensible from a political or electoral 
perspective?  
 
In terms of whether it constitutes effective policy making, those who are critical 
of the 0.7 percent commitment have four strands to their critique. The first strand 
relates to international comparisons. For example, Philip Davies was keen to 
emphasise how Germany was spending only 0.38 percent of GNI, and the United 
States was spending only 0.19 percent of GNI and yet they were ‘both wealthier’ than 
the UK (HC Deb, 12 September, 2014, Col. 1183). Building upon this theme, Davies 
wanted to know why the UK had ‘increased’ their level of international aid 
expenditure just as ‘other countries had reduced the proportion they spend on aid’ 
(HC Deb, 12 September, 2014, Col. 1168). Rather than other countries following the 
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lead that was being set by the UK Government, Davies argued that ‘they are using our 
increased spending as an excuse to reduce theirs’ (Davies, HC Deb, 12 September 2014, 
Col. 1168). David Nuttall sought to embarrass Cameron at Prime Minister’s Questions 
by asking when ‘other members of the G20 plan to meet’ what Nuttall dismissed as 
an ‘arbitrary target’ (HC Deb, 13 September 2013, Col. 699).  
 
The second strand to their critique focuses on the relationship between input 
and outcomes. For example, why was the emphasis on the amount the government 
was spending, rather than the effectiveness (or results) of the policy? Davies captured 
that traditionalist Conservative opposition to targets by critiquing the relationship 
between spending targets and policy achievements under the previous Labour 
administration vis-à-vis truancy. Davies noted that Labour ministers believed that the 
expenditure increases in themselves represented progress i.e. ‘truancy had got worse’, 
but ‘that did not matter because they had spent £1 billion extra on tackling it’ (HC 
Deb, 12 September 2014, Col. 1227). Davies concluded that if the policy of increasing 
international aid provision was succeeding, then ‘those countries will have been able 
to sort themselves out and therefore we will be spending less’. By implication, success 
would invalidate the need to ‘fix a high amount of money for aid in perpetuity’ and 
that legislative action to compel spending remaining at 0.7 percent of GNI was ‘an 
acceptance that assistance will fail [and] that it will not turn around a country’s 
fortunes or deal with the causes of poverty’ (HC Deb, 12 September 2014, Col. 1168). 
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Boasting that a spending target has been achieved should not be the aim of 
policy formulation explained Peter Bone, as he demanded that the government 
realised that ‘we should not set targets for overseas aid’, rather we ‘should give what 
is required’ (HC Deb, 12 June 2013, Col, 564). Edward Leigh extended this theme by 
arguing that ‘we should be judged not by how much we spend on something, but by 
the value for money of what we achieve’ (HC Deb, 12 September 2014, Col. 1181). In 
addition to debates about what was required and what was being achieved, Bone also 
raised doubts about the UK’s ability to provide over the longer term, asking ‘if we are 
in a recession, as we have been, does the 0.7% commitment mean that the amount of 
overseas aid will go down?’ (HC Deb, 13 July 2012, Col. 548).  
 
The third strand to this part of their critique would relate to concerns about 
waste, inefficiency and even allegations of corruption. Here some Conservative 
backbenchers argued that the growth in the international aid budget ran hand in hand 
with increasing misuse of funds. Leigh concluded that ‘when we have a departmental 
budget’ which is ‘awash with money and is growing all the time’ this raises concerns 
about ‘money being wasted’ (HC Deb, 3 November, 2014, Col. 611). Nuttall focused 
on his concern about the lack of efficiency in a target-driven, rather than results-
driven, policy approach. He cited research that has ‘shown that of 20 countries in 
receipt of UK aid 10 had shown little or no improvement in the amount of political, 
economic and press freedom they enjoyed and five actually enjoyed less freedom’ (HC 
Deb, 6 November 2014, Col. 974). David Davis questioned why international aid 
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should be directed at nations such as India or China (Chorley, 2012), whilst fellow 
defeated leadership rival, Liam Fox, argued that ‘countries need to earn the support 
from the British taxpayer’ after it was revealed that £200 million had been spent on 
international aid for Tanzania, despite international criticism of their democratic 
procedures (Blair, 2016). Former Cabinet Minister, Owen Paterson, could not 
understand how, when the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had declared the 
Tanzania election as ‘not valid’, DfID could keep ‘carrying on spending the money 
anyway’ (Morris, 2016). On the misuse of tax payers’ money, Matthew Offord 
complained that ‘our money is going to some causes’ that electors ‘would be ashamed 
of’ (HC Deb, 13 June 2016, Col. 271). Offord complained that when such misuse does 
occur, ‘despite being presented with evidence’ of ‘behaviour that contravenes aid 
agreements’, DfID ‘takes no remedial action’ (HC Deb, 13 June 2016, Col. 271).   
The fourth and final strand of their critique on policy making would relate to 
whether it is ideologically consistent with Conservative thinking. The most obvious 
ideological objection relates to its interventionist mentality. Davies was particularly 
strident on this. He argued that the government could not campaign ‘to stop welfare 
dependency at home’ and breaking the assumption that some had of ‘waiting for their 
next handout from the state’, and then do the exact opposite vis-à-vis international 
aid’ (HC Deb, 12 September 2014, Col. 1236). Davies implied that DfID was 
‘entrenching welfare dependency abroad’, arguing that they are ‘saying to countries 
“it doesn’t matter what you do with your governance or what you spend your money 
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on; we will keep handing over the cheques come what may”’ (HC Deb, 12 September 
2014, Col. 1236).  
 
Alongside critiquing whether it is sensible in terms of policy making, 
Conservative backbench critics have also raised concerns about whether international 
aid prioritisation amounts to a sensible political strategy. They did not accept the 
Cameron argument that international aid prioritisation contributed to the 
detoxification of the Conservative brand by showcasing their compassionate thinking. 
Quite the reverse. They felt that international aid came at the expense of their 
constituents. They would argue that their constituents did not share in the 
modernisers’ belief that international aid should be protected at the expense of other 
spheres of governmental activity.  
 
Gerard Howarth described it as a ‘question of priorities’ noting that in his 
constituency he was ‘yet to meet any of our people in the streets who think that this 
target should be a priority’  (HC Deb, 4 November 2014, Col. 5). He related this to the 
democratic process arguing that ‘elections are about priorities’ and that parties place 
before the electorate their ‘different priorities’. He argued that legally enshrining 0.7 
percent of GNI on international aid meant that one departmental area was being given 
‘special treatment’ over other policy areas, such as health care or education, which 
were ‘undoubtedly of concern’ to the electorate. He claimed that ring fencing future 
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spending on international aid was ‘an attempt to limit the choices available to the 
people in a general election’ (HC Deb, 4 November, 2014, Col. 4).  
 
Stewart Jackson extended that argument about prioritisation and the decision 
to legally obligate successor governments to spend 0.7 percent of GNI on international 
aid. Speaking as an advocate for his constituents he asked why the government was 
seeking to ‘hypothecate into the future’ when ‘in every other domestic area, including 
important areas such as literacy, social care and cancer, they set their face against such 
hypothecation?’ (HC Deb, 12 September 2014, Col. 1228). James Gray embraced this 
theme by asking ‘why should spending on overseas aid be written in law, but not the 
National Health Service?’ (12 September 2014, Col. 1170). Davies located the debate 
about prioritisation within the wider context of national austerity, arguing that to 
increase spending so significantly and to protect future spending when ‘we have no 
money’ and we have to ‘cut spending everywhere’ is ‘completely and utterly 
ridiculous’ (HC Deb, 12 September 2014, Col. 1228). Chris Chope cited findings from 
the 2012 British Social Attitudes Survey on what were the priorities for voters, noting 
that 41.9 percent identified health care; 30 percent said education, and only 0.5 percent 
responded with international aid’ (HC Deb, 5 December 2014, Col. 597). 
 
However, when it came to alternative prioritisation the issue of defence 
spending seemed more important to aid critics than health care, education or any 
other area of domestic expenditure. Indeed, in the lead up period to the 2015 Strategic 
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and Defence Review, the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, made a ‘less than subtle 
grab’ for the ‘foreign aid budget in an attempt to add it to the defence budget’ and, 
although the manoeuvre failed, Fallon did so because he had the backing of a ‘number 
of Conservative backbenchers’ (Dorman et al, 2016). This was the reaction to the brutal 
treatment to which the Ministry of Defence was subjected when Cameron first entered 
office. As he was ring fencing international aid spending Cameron publicly criticised 
the Ministry of Defence for being ‘too big, too inefficient’ and for ‘spending too much 
money’ (HC Deb, 19 October 2010, Col. 798). This factor, alongside the modernisers’ 
belief that there were ‘no votes in defence or foreign policy’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 
2015: 490) explained Cameron’s reluctance to maintain UK defence spending at the 
NATO set target of 2 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2015, (although he u-turned 
on this after the General Election of 2015) (Dorman et al, 2016). In the first year of the 
coalition, this placed him on a collision course with Fox, as Defence Secretary (2010–
11), who was compelled to implement an 8 percent cut in defence spending (Kirkup, 
2011).  
 
Speaking of the so called development/defence ‘trade off’ (Seldon and 
Snowdon, 2015), Adam Holloway concluded that it was ‘completely crazy’ that a 
‘deeply indebted nation’ was ring fencing international aid spending, when they were 
failing in their ‘first duty’ by ‘cutting defence spending’ (HC Deb, 12 September 2014, 
Col. 1204). Howarth, formerly a junior minister in the Ministry of Defence (2010–12), 
questioned the argument that the international aid prioritisation equated to influence. 
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Describing international aid as ‘soft power’, as opposed to the ‘hard power’ of military 
capability, he argued that ‘if one walks with a big stick, one can speak softly, but what 
we are doing is losing that big stick’. He warned Parliament that we ‘should not 
confuse that humanitarian exercise with hard power—the ability to fight’ (HC Deb, 4 
November 2014, Col. 6). The imbalance in prioritisation between protecting 
international aid spending and cutting spending on the armed forces irked Howarth, 
who placed that choice within the context of meeting soldiers from his constituency. 
Howarth asked ‘how can I look a soldier in the eye’ [in his constituency] and say:  
‘Thank you for your service in Afghanistan, where you put your life on the line, 
were shot at, had your vehicle blown up, and you survived. I am sorry we’re 
having to make you redundant, but the good news is I’ve got a lot more money 
for overseas aid?’  
(HC Deb, 4 November 2014, Col. 6) 
 
International Aid and Hard Euroscepticism  
Backbench Conservative critics have doubted the electoral rationale for international 
aid prioritisation. Their concern was that subsuming the Conservatives within a cross 
party consensus with Labour and the Liberal Democrats, was (1) not a vote winner, 
and (2) created opportunities for UKIP to exploit. Those fears were substantiated by 
findings from a YouGov-Chatham House survey in the lead up to the 2015 General 
Election. Only 30 percent of the electorate approved of the current level of 
international aid spending, and 54 percent agreed with the position of reducing 
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spending on aid abroad and increasing domestic spending (given the economic 
constraints). That 54 percent figure increased to 62 percent amongst known 
Conservative supporters, while a further increase to 87 percent existed amongst 
known UKIP supporters. Given the assumption that the Conservatives might already 
be vulnerable to UKIP (notably on the issue of immigration), the concern was that 
UKIP might be able to appeal to Conservative voters who opposed aid spending 
(Bailey, 2014). 
 
Having considered the arguments used by backbench critics of aid 
prioritisation, it is worth analysing what other characteristics unite (or do not unite) 
such Conservatives. To achieve this we identified which Conservative 
parliamentarians in the 2010 to 2015 Parliament were aid critics i.e. voted against the 
government across a range of divisions during the passage of the International 
Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act of 2015; those that were 
aid sceptics (abstained from voting); and those that were aid advocates (voted for). We 
supplement this method by exploiting parliamentary speeches, and television and 
print media interviews, during the passage of the above legislation and other 
numerous public interventions that relate to the 0.7 percent target. From this we 
determined that 190 Conservatives were pro aid (61.7 percent of the PCP); 94 were 
best defined as aid sceptics (30.5 percent), and 24 were aid critics (7.8 percent). 
 
Identity Papers: A Journal of British and Irish Studies 
2017 2 (1) 
16 
 
If we update existing academic research, profiling the ideological composition 
of the 2010 to 2015 PCP, then we know the following about the European ideological 
divide. A total of 71 members were either pro-European (i.e. proactively argued the 
case for the benefits of EU membership) or agnostic (do not publicly comment on the 
EU explicitly); 156 were soft Eurosceptics (i.e. they accepted the principle of continued 
membership but opposed further integrationist objectives, and actually advocated 
renegotiated membership terms); and 81 were hard Eurosceptic rejectionists (i.e. they 
were willing to make the case for exiting the European Union) (Heppell, 2013, see also 
Lynch, 2015). In table one—below—we have cross referenced our research findings 
on international aid to those that already exist vis-à-vis European Union membership. 
Table 1  
The PCP and Attitudes toward international aid 
          
Variable Pro-Aid Sceptics Critics Total 
Vote Share 190 (61.7%) 94 (30.5%) 24 (7.8%) 308 (100%) 
Hard 
Eurosceptic 39 (48.2%) 23 (28.4%) 19 (23.5%) 
 
81 (100%) 
Soft 
Eurosceptic  106 (68.0%) 45 (28.9%) 5 (3.2%) 
 
156 (100%) 
Agnostic 45 (63.4%) 26 (36.6%) 0 (0.0%) 71 (100%) 
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From this the following conclusions can be drawn. The relationship between hard 
Euroscepticism and international aid spending is more complex than might be 
assumed. The majority of pro-aid sentiment was located within the Cameron-like soft 
Eurosceptic faction (106 members out of 190 pro-aid Conservatives). Those who were 
the outright critics of the 0.7 percent commitment were disproportionately hard 
Eurosceptics—19 out of 24 of them—but the critical observation is that nearly half of 
all of the 81 hard Eurosceptics (39) chose to vote for, and/or speak out for, the 0.7 
percent commitment. Of those 24 critics, two of them were Douglas Carswell and 
Mark Reckless—who were elected as Conservatives in May 2010 but both chose to 
defect to UKIP in 2014. The other intriguing aspect when we look at the known aid 
critics is the fact that two of them are Davis and Fox. After Cameron was succeeded 
by Theresa May, Davis was appointed Secretary of State in the newly formed 
Department for Exiting the European Union and Fox was made Secretary of State in 
the newly established Department for International Trade. As Fox had earlier 
bemoaned what he called the ‘spraying around’ of aid, (Sculthorpe, 2016) and  Davis 
had dismissed Cameron’s ‘arbitrary target’ as ‘nonsense’ (Simons, 2012), the 
promotion of known aid critics to key Cabinet posts might have an influence on future 
policy direction. 
Conclusion 
Our paper provides a detailed overview of opinion within the PCP towards 
international aid spending and the 0.7 percent commitment. It showcases that 61.7 
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percent of the PCP (or 190 members) were willing to vote in favour of legally 
enshrining the 0.7 percent commitment, and that a further 30.5 percent (94 members) 
were unwilling to vote against it, even if they may have had reservations. It also shows 
the level of outright opposition to international aid spending and the 0.7 percent 
commitment in the period 2010 to 2015 was remarkably small, thus suggesting that 
Cameron was relatively successful in converting his colleagues to this cause. 
However, it also demonstrates that whilst the soft Eurosceptic (and ultimately remain) 
grouping (156 strong) tended towards supporting the 0.7 international aid 
commitment—68 percent in favour and only 3 percent against—Cameron found 
gaining the approval of the hard Eurosceptic faction harder. Amongst those that 
would form the basis of Brexit Conservatives a lower level of support for the 0.7 
commitment was evident (at 48 percent), but more significantly it was hard 
Eurosceptic or Brexit Conservatives which formed the basis of the rebellion against 
the 0.7 percent commitment. Although only 7.8 percent of the PCP (24) openly 
opposed international aid prioritisation, those that did were also overwhelmingly 
hostile to the European Union.  
 
This is relevant both in terms of Brexit and the change of leadership. Brexit 
raises a complex range of policy questions vis-à-vis international aid, and the future 
viability of the 0.7 percent commitment. One scenario in which this could occur is if 
there is a post Brexit economic downturn. The need to find further expenditure cuts 
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could mean that international aid prioritisation is abandoned and the commitment to 
0.7 percent spending could be reversed (Barber, 2016).  
 
This raises the further question as to how committed to the Cameron aid legacy his 
successor, Theresa May, actually is. Anders noted that she had ‘rarely taken a stand 
on aid related issues’ and there she had ‘managed to avoid voting’ (i.e. abstained) on 
‘any of the half dozen measures relating to enshrining the aid budget at 0.7 percent of 
GNI’ (meaning she is defined as a sceptic in table one) (Anders, 2016). She is said to 
be ambivalent on the issue – leading to newspaper reports of Cameron pleading with 
her to sustain his aid legacy (Slack, 2016). Under May the overriding policy question 
is how the £1.4 billion of aid spending that is currently channelled through the EU 
should be utilised post Brexit. This provides clear scope for deployment or 
reprioritisation (Anderson et al, 2016)—targeting aid more towards the poorest 
countries and communities—and a rethink in terms of aid effectiveness.  
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